❤❤❤ Animal Liberation Front Attacks

Wednesday, June 23, 2021 5:40:46 PM

Animal Liberation Front Attacks

On this hypothesis, only Don Marquis Why Abortion Is Immoral Analysis animal liberation front attacks, and not animal liberation front attacks, fish, or any invertebrates, possess Roles Of Daylight In Architecture. Retrieved 1 August Think animal liberation front attacks of whether animal liberation front attacks is possible animal liberation front attacks the monkey to report that it is subject to Gestalt switches like animal liberation front attacks arising from ambiguous figures such as the duck-rabbit or figure-vase illusions. Retrieved 30 September To animal liberation front attacks a negative How Upton Sinclair Changed American about the former, one must also assume animal liberation front attacks consciousness has absolutely no measurable effects on animal liberation front attacks, i. Drug Development and Industrial Pharmacy. ECW Press. As Searle animal liberation front attacks it, I do not Horse Bots Research Paper that animal liberation front attacks dog is conscious, any more than, when I came into this animal liberation front attacks, I inferred that the people present are conscious.

KGW Vault: Eco-terrorism in Oregon

Chimpanzees tend to be used repeatedly over decades, rather than used and killed as with most laboratory animals. Some individual chimpanzees currently in U. She was removed from her mother on the day of birth to be used in a vision experiment that lasted 17 months, then sold as a pet to a family in North Carolina. She was returned to the Yerkes National Primate Research Center in when she became too big to handle. Since then, she has given birth six times, and has been used in research into alcohol use, oral contraceptives, aging, and cognitive studies. With the publication of the chimpanzee genome , there are reportedly plans to increase the use of chimpanzees in labs, with scientists arguing that the federal moratorium on breeding chimpanzees for research should be lifted.

Pascal Gagneux, an evolutionary biologist and primate expert at the University of California, San Diego , argues that, given chimpanzees' sense of self, tool use, and genetic similarity to human beings, studies using chimpanzees should follow the ethical guidelines that are used for human subjects unable to give consent. He told National Geographic : "I don't think we should make a distinction between our obligation to treat humanely any species, whether it's a rat or a monkey or a chimpanzee. No matter how much we may wish it, chimps are not human. In January the Institute of Medicine was asked by the NIH to examine whether the government should keep supporting biomedical research on chimpanzees.

The NIH called for the study after protests by the Humane Society of the United States , primatologist Jane Goodall and others, when it announced plans to move semi-retired chimpanzees back into active research. Later that day Francis Collins , a head of the NIH, said the agency would stop issuing new awards for research involving chimpanzees until the recommendations developed by the IOM are implemented. On 21 September , the NIH announced that chimpanzees owned by the government were to be retired. The NIH owned about chimpanzees for research, and this move signified the first step to wind down its investment in chimpanzee research, according to Collins. On 17 October , it was announced that as many chimpanzees as possible will be relocated to Chimp Haven by August , and that eventually all will move there.

In the NIH agreed with the IOM's recommendations [73] that experimentation on chimpanzees was unnecessary and rarely helped in advancing human health for infectious diseases and that the NIH would phase out most of its government-funded experiments on chimpanzees. The panel concluded that the animals provide little benefit in biomedical discoveries except in a few disease cases which can be supported by a small population of 50 primates for future research.

It suggested that other approaches, such as genetically altered mice, should be developed and refined instead. Until the USFWS proposal, chimpanzees were the only species with a split listing that did not also classify captive members of the species as endangered. Two years later, on June 16, , the USFWS announced that it has designated both captive and wild chimpanzees as endangered. As the trend continues, it is estimated the remaining non-government owned 1, chimpanzees will be retired to sanctuaries around In the s, Jonas Salk used rhesus monkey cross-contamination studies to isolate the three forms of the polio virus that crippled hundreds of thousands of people yearly across the world at the time.

The vaccine was made publicly available in , and reduced the incidence of polio fold in the USA over the following five years. Albert Sabin made a superior "live" vaccine by passing the polio virus through animal hosts, including monkeys. The vaccine was produced for mass consumption in and is still in use today. It had virtually eradicated polio in the United States by In the s, Roger Sperry developed split-brain preparations in non-human primates that emphasized the importance of information transfer that occurred in these neocortical connections.

For example, learning on simple tasks, if restricted in sensory input and motor output to one hemisphere of a split-brain animal, would not transfer to the other hemisphere. The right brain has no idea what the left brain is up to, if these specific connections are cut. Those experiments were followed by tests on human beings with epilepsy who had undergone split-brain surgery, which established that the neocortical connections between hemispheres are the principal route for cognition to transfer from one side of the brain to another. These experiments also formed the modern basis for lateralization of function in the human brain. In the s, David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel demonstrated the macrocolumnar organization of visual areas in cats and monkeys, and provided physiological evidence for the critical period for the development of disparity sensitivity in vision i.

They were awarded a Nobel Prize for their work. Later that same year, researchers reproduced the effect in non-human primates. Over the next seven years, the brain areas that were over- and under-active in Parkinson's were mapped out in normal and MPTP-treated macaque monkeys using metabolic labelling and microelectrode studies. In , deep brain lesions were shown to treat Parkinsonian symptoms in macaque monkeys treated with MPTP, and these were followed by pallidotomy operations in humans with similar efficacy. By , it was shown that deep brain stimulation could effect the same treatment without causing a permanent lesion of the same magnitude. Current estimates are that 20, Parkinson's patients have received this treatment.

The drug tenofovir has had its efficacy and toxicology evaluated in macaques, and found longterm-highdose treatments had adverse effects not found using short term-high dose treatment followed by long term-low dose treatment. This finding in macaques was translated into human dosing regimens. Prophylactic treatment with anti-virals has been evaluated in macaques, because introduction of the virus can only be controlled in an animal model. The finding that prophylaxis can be effective at blocking infection has altered the treatment for occupational exposures, such as needle exposures. Such exposures are now followed rapidly with anti-HIV drugs, and this practice has resulted in measurable transient virus infection similar to the NHP model.

Similarly, the mother-to-fetus transmission, and its fetal prophylaxis with antivirals such as tenofovir and AZT, has been evaluated in controlled testing in macaques not possible in humans, and this knowledge has guided antiviral treatment in pregnant mothers with HIV. Although each animal model has its limitations, carefully designed drug studies in nonhuman primates can continue to advance our scientific knowledge and guide future clinical trials.

The reason for studying primates is due to the similar complexity of the cerebral processes in the human brain which controls emotional responses and can be beneficial for testing new pharmacological treatments. They were presented with a taxidermized wild-cat, rattlesnake, a hawk as well as a stuffed toy bear on one side of the maze. Two cameras and a two way mirror was used to observe the difference between the monkeys natural behaviors versus the behaviors expressed by the diazepam induced monkeys in thirteen different locations inside the maze. Scientist Barros and his colleagues created this model to allow the monkeys to roam a less confined environment and slightly eliminate outside factors that may induce stress.

Many of the best-known allegations of abuse made by animal protection or animal rights groups against animal-testing facilities involve non-human primates. The so-called "pit of despair" was used in experiments conducted on rhesus macaque monkeys during the s by American comparative psychologist Harry Harlow at the University of Wisconsin—Madison. The vertical chamber was a stainless-steel bin with slippery sides that sloped to a rounded bottom. The chamber had a food box and a water-bottle holder, and was covered with a pyramid top so that the monkeys were unable to escape. Within a few days, they stopped moving about and remained huddled in a corner.

The monkeys generally exhibited marked social impairment and peer hostility when removed from the chamber; most did not recover. According to Vicky Miller of PETA, who reported the raid to newswire services, UC-Riverside "has been using animals in experiments on sight deprivation and isolation for the last two years and has recently received a grant, paid for with our tax dollars, to continue torturing and killing animals. UCR officials also reported the raid also included smashing equipment and resulted in several hundred thousand dollars of damage. Staff were filmed handling monkeys roughly, screaming at them, and making them dance to blaring music.

The monkeys were shown isolated in small wire cages with little or no natural light, no environmental enrichment, and subjected to high noise levels from staff shouting and playing the radio. Primatologist Jane Goodall described their living conditions as "horrendous. A veterinary toxicologist employed as a study director at Covance in Vienna, Virginia , from to , told city officials in Chandler, Arizona , that Covance was dissecting monkeys while the animals were still alive and able to feel pain. The employee approached the city with her concerns when she learned that Covance planned to build a new laboratory in Chandler. She alleged that three monkeys in the Vienna laboratory had pushed themselves up on their elbows and had gasped for breath after their eyes had been removed, and while their intestines were being removed during necropsies autopsy.

When she expressed concern at the next study directors' meeting, she says she was told that it was just a reflex. She told city officials that she believed such movements were not reflexes but suggested "botched euthanasia performed by inadequately trained personnel. In the UK, after an undercover investigation in , the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection BUAV , a lobby group, reported that researchers in Cambridge University's primate-testing labs were sawing the tops off marmosets' heads, inducing strokes, then leaving them overnight without veterinarian care, because staff worked only nine to five.

The monkeys were deprived of food and water to encourage them to perform the tasks, with water being withheld for 22 out of every 24 hours. The Research Defence Society defended Cambridge's research. The RDS wrote that the monkeys were fully anaesthetised, and appropriate pain killers were given after the surgery. They were then allowed to sleep in the incubators until the next morning.

No monkeys died unattended during the night after stroke surgery. BUAV appealed. In , CNN reported that a post-doctoral veterinarian at Columbia University complained to the university's Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee about experiments being conducted on baboons by E. Sander Connolly, an assistant professor of neurosurgery. Connolly developed this methodology to make more consistent stroke infarcts in primates, which would improve the detection of differences in stroke treatment groups, and "provide important information not obtainable in rodent models.

An investigation by the U. Department of Agriculture found "no indication that the experiments In , activists forced a primate researcher at UCLA to shut down the experiments in his lab. His name, phone number, and address were posted on the website of the UCLA Primate Freedom Project , along with a description of his research, which stated that he had "received a grant to kill 30 macaque monkeys for vision experiments. Each monkey is first paralyzed, then used for a single session that lasts up to hours, and finally killed.

A Molotov cocktail was placed on the porch of what was believed to be the home of another UCLA primate researcher. Instead, it was accidentally left on the porch of an elderly woman unrelated to the university. As a result of the campaign, the researcher sent an email to the Primate Freedom Project stating "you win", and "please don't bother my family anymore. London conducts research on addiction using non-human primates, and no claims were made by the ALF of any violation of any rules or regulations regarding the use of animals in research.

In , a UCLA neurobiologist known for using animals to research drug addiction and other psychiatric disorders had his car burned for the second time. In infectious disease research, China invests more than the U. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Experimentation using other primate animals. Animal testing Alternatives to animal testing Animal testing regulations History of animal testing History of model organisms IACUC Laboratory animal sources Pain and suffering in laboratory animals Testing cosmetics on animals Toxicology testing Vivisection. Invertebrates Frogs primates Rabbits Rodents. Animal testing Animal rights Animal welfare. The Movement. Advocates Vegans Groups. Related topics. Environmentalism Radical Deep ecology Humanism. Further information: Great ape research ban.

District Judge John Roll killed, U. Capitol turned into violent riot inside Capitol; 5 rioters died; Capitol Police officers injured 02 Apr Washington, DC 2 1 TER-islm Noah Green drove car into capitol police officers at barricade, killing one and injuring another; attacker was shot and killed. Seward injured separately by accomplice Lewis Powell; Lincoln died 15 April. Kentucky Representative William Taulbee shot outside U. Capitol by Charles Kincaid; Taulbee died 11 March.

Representative John Pinckney among four killed at a Prohibition rally during exchange of gunfire initiated by an anti-Prohibition attorney. Stephen J. Supona dropped homemade bomb from airplane over United Nations building; no damage caused. Puerto Rican nationalists fire from gallery of U. House of Representatives; 5 Congressman injured. Cubana Airlines flight hijacked from Miami by members of 26th of July Movement; plane crashed near Punta Tabaio, Cuba, killing 17 of 20 aboard. Such an approach is nascent in Griffin's attempts to force ethologists to pay attention to questions about animal consciousness, in all its senses — including phenomenal consciousness. In a series of books, Griffin who made his scientific reputation by carefully detailing the physical and physiological characteristics of echolocation by bats provides examples of communicative and problem-solving behavior by animals, particularly under natural conditions, and argues that these are prime places for ethologists to begin their investigations of animal consciousness Griffin , , Although he thinks that the intelligence displayed by these examples suggests conscious thought, many critics have been disappointed by the lack of systematic connection between Griffin's examples and the attribution of consciousness see, e.

Griffin's main positive proposal in this respect has been the rather implausible suggestion that consciousness might have the function of compensating for limited neural machinery. Thus Griffin is motivated to suggest that consciousness may be more important to honey bees than to humans. If compensating for small sets of neurons is not a plausible function for consciousness, what might be? But this answer begs the question against opponents of attributing conscious states to animals for it fails to respect the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and mere awareness in the uncontroversial sense of detection of environmental or bodily events. Opponents of attributing phenomenal consciousness to animals are not committed to denying the more general kind of consciousness of various external and bodily events, so there is no logical entailment from awareness of things in the environment or the body to animal sentience.

Perhaps more sophisticated attempts to spell out the functions of consciousness are similarly doomed. Not all adjustments to error provide grounds for suspecting that consciousness is involved, but in cases where an organism can adjust to a perceptual error while retaining the capacity to exploit the content of the erroneous perception, then there may be a robust sense in which the animal internally distinguishes its own appearance states from other judgments about the world. Humans, for instance, have conscious visual experiences that they know are misleading — i. It is important, however, to emphasize that such capacities are not themselves intended to be definitive or in any way criterial for consciousness.

Carruthers makes a similar suggestion about the function of consciousness, relating it to the general capacity for making an appearance-reality distinction; of course, he continues to maintain that this capacity depends upon having conceptual resources that are beyond the grasp of nonhuman animals. The broad issue of function is closely related to questions about just what sort of mental process consciousness is. As we shall see in the next section, hypotheses in the modern literature on the distribution and evolution of consciousness are therefore generally advanced together with theories of its structure and function in the following senses:. Structure: what are the contents of consciousness what information, representations, intentional contents, properties, processes, etc.

What possibly unconscious or subconscious information, representations, or other cognitive or intentional processes, entities and relations, are required for consciousness? Function: how does consciousness relate to other nonconscious processes, in cognition, the body and the environment? How does possessing consciousness contribute to an animal's ability to navigate and respond adaptively to its environment, to survive and thrive?

Different views about what consciousness is, qua cognitive process, and how it relates to other biological processes such as behavior, development and ecological interaction, largely determine biologically oriented views about which animals have consciousness and when, how, and why it evolved. To illustrate this, we can start with a crude distinction between views that see consciousness as fundamental to the basic perceptual and cognitive processes involved in controlling an animal body, or as something that can be added on or plugged in to a system that is already sufficient for basic control of perception-guided action.

The more fundamental consciousness is to basic animal functioning, the more widely distributed and ancient consciousness must be; if, however, consciousness is relatively modular, functionally narrow, and conceptually high level, then it should be narrowly distributed among animals and relatively recently evolved. The views surveyed in the following section all exploit the connections between function, structure, distribution and evolutionary origin. One further point worth noting is that structural models of consciousness are usually justified in terms of phenomenological or introspective observations — i. Though the use of such first person methods is now and has been controversial in psychology and philosophy throughout the 20th and 21st century, there seems to now be a broad acknowledgement that it has an indispensable role in the scientific study of consciousness, as many authors who have published recent scientific theories of consciousness include some appeal to phenomenological premises in justifying their views e.

A variety of hypotheses have been put forward by scientists and philosophers about which animals are conscious and which are not. These views span a huge range of possibilities, from the narrowest, which is that only humans are conscious, to some authors arguing that almost all animals, even simple invertebrates, have a basic capacity to experience the world. Some authors have even argued that single-celled organisms Margulis or plants A. Nagel are conscious, and some have given arguments for versions of pan-psychism, the view that consciousness is a property of fundamental physical entities, much in the same way that mass and charge are Chalmers It is worth noting that neither the attribution of consciousness to single-celled organisms, nor to fundamental physical entities, implies that all animals are conscious.

In the former case, it may be that the information processing complexity and integration of relatively complex single-celled organisms outstrips that of the simplest animals. This view is compatible with the possibility that a given animal has no conscious experience, although it is composed of microphysical entities which possess conscious microexperience. These issues will not be discussed further here, as they fall outside the scope of Animal Consciousness. The question of which lineages species, or more inclusive groupings such as class or phylum of animals are conscious, inevitably goes hand-in-hand with considerations of the evolutionary origin of consciousness. This is a logical implication of the broadly Darwinian view of life, on which modern organisms have evolved through descent, with modification, from a small number perhaps one of very ancient ancestors.

If a trait is characteristic of a given species, it either arose in that species, or is derived from an ancestor — in which case, it will be present in other species derived from that ancestor, unless it has been secondarily lost in those species. Did consciousness first arise in humans, or in an earlier, nonhuman ancestor? If the latter, then what was this ancestor?

Another possibility is that consciousness may have arisen multiple times, like winged flight, which evolved independently in insects, birds, bats, and pterosaurs. As described above, the view that consciousness is unique to humans has a long history. It coheres with a religious view of humanity as the pinnacle of creation, and it also may be appealing insofar as it absolves us of any guilt for our treatment of animals. Religion aside, it may derive considerable intuitive support because of the appeal of connecting consciousness to the problem of human uniquenesss. If consciousness can be tied together with language, abstract reasoning, or some other mental characteristic that potentially could explain our apparent seperateness from the natural world, this would solve two outstanding mysteries at once.

Dennett , has been an outspoken advocate of the human-uniqueness of consciousness. On Dennett's view, because consciousness is a sort of story telling, which requires language, and only adult, normally enculturated and language-capable humans have language, only these humans have consciousness. Carruthers has championed the view that only humans with the possible exception of chimpanzees are conscious, although for different reasons than Dennett. And, Carruthers maintains, there is little basis for thinking that any nonhuman animals have a theory of mind, with the possible exception of chimpanzees see Lurz and Andrews for in depth discussion of theory of mind in nonhuman animals. This argument is, of course, no stronger than the higher-order thought account of consciousness upon which it is based.

But setting that aside for the sake of argument, this challenge by Carruthers deserves further attention as perhaps the most empirically-detailed case against animal consciousness to have been made in the philosophical literature. Carruthers neither endorses nor outright rejects the conclusion that chimpanzees are sentient. His suspicion that even chimpanzees might lack theory of mind, and therefore on his view phenomenal consciousness, is based on some ingenious laboratory studies by Povinelli showing that in interactions with human food providers, chimpanzees apparently fail to understand the role of eyes in providing visual information to the humans, despite their outwardly similar behavior to humans in attending to cues such as facial orientation.

The interpretation of Povinelli's work remains controversial. Hare et al. Given the uncertainty, Carruthers is therefore well-advised in the tentative manner in which he puts forward his claims about chimpanzee sentience. A full discussion of the controversy over theory of mind e. Alternative approaches that have attempted to provide strong evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman animals under natural conditions have generally failed to produce such evidence see, e.

Furthermore, theory of mind — and social cognition more broadly — are active areas of research, and it is quite possible that new research will reveal evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman animals. On views such as Carruthers', consciousness is grounded in cognitive processes that are highly specific and modular — indeed, irrelevant for the perceptual, motivational and cognitive processes involved with all nonhuman animal behavior. Given that most of the cognitive processes and corresponding brain-systems involved with human activities are shared with nonhuman animals, this line of thinking implies that much of human activity is nonconscious as well. This comparison of animal behavior to the unconscious capacities of humans can be criticized on the grounds that, like Descartes' pronouncements on parrots, it is based only on unsystematic observation of animal behavior.

There are grounds for thinking that careful investigation would reveal that there is not a very close analogy between animal behavior and human behaviors associated with these putative cases of unconscious experience. For instance, it is notable that the unconscious experiences of automatic driving are not remembered by their subjects, whereas there is no evidence that animals are similarly unable to recall their allegedly unconscious experiences. Likewise, blindsight subjects do not spontaneously respond to things presented to their scotomas, but must be trained to make responses using a forced-response paradigm.

Nevertheless, there are empirical grounds for concern that behavior suggesting consciousness in animals may be the product of unconscious processes. Allen et al. In intact animals, these learning and memory related phenomena have been argued to involve attention. But their similarity to mechanisms in the spinal cord, assumed by most not to involve consciousness, calls into question their status as evidence for consciousness. But the current point is similar to that made about blindsight: a more fine-grained analysis of these similarities and differences is needed before conclusions about consciousness can be drawn. Gallup developed an experimental test of mirror self-recognition that has become widely used as a test of self-awareness, although interpretation of the test remains controversial see the section on self-consciousness and metacognition below.

Gallup argues that the performance of chimpanzees in this test indicates that they are self-aware, and that animals that fail the test lack self-awareness. He took this to support the claim that self-awareness is unique to great apes Gallup et al. Combined with his earlier arguments that consciousness requires the sort of self-awareness measured by the mirror test, this would imply that consciousness is unique to the great apes. Gallup's interpretation of the mirror results have not been uncontroversial Mitchell Rochat and Zahavi challenge Gallup both on a the interpretation of chimps' mirror-oriented behavior as indicating a human-like experience of mirror self-recognition, and b the claim that mirror self-recognition is implied by consciousness.

The crux of the debate is not whether the great apes have consciousness per se this seems to be assumed by most participants of the debate, on both sides , but whether they have personhood. Personhood is a vexed notion, but is generally thought to be related to certain forms of agency and self awareness, and is often thought to be tightly coupled to moral status, as reflected in this debate DeGrazia ; SEP article on Moral Status of Animals; Varner Though not essential to phenomenal consciousness, personhood is often thought to presuppose consciousness, and so perhaps is best thought of as a level of elaboration or complexity of consciousness. A variety of theoretical and empirical arguments have been put forward to the effect that consciousness is shared across all mammals.

Seth, Baars and Edelman argue that the neural processes essential to human conscious — widespread reentrant activity in the thalamo-cortical complex — involve anatomical systems that are shared among all mammals and perhaps more widely. Although in both of the above proposals, the authors acknowledge that consciousness may be more widespread than just mammals, they argue that in the case of mammals, the weight of evidence based on homology of relevant neurophysiological systems is overwhelming, whereas outside of mammals, the inference is more tenuous because of the biological differences in non-mammalian animals. Further, it should be kept in mind that all of the following proposals imply that consciousness is widely shared among mammals.

Hence, the position that all mammals are conscious is widely agreed upon among scientists who express views on the distribution of consciousness. Do birds and mammals share mental features consciousness, intelligence, emotion, social attachment that are absent in reptiles? If so this would represent independent, convergent evolution of these phenomena. Alternatively, are these features common to all of these animals, but less obvious in some than others? Cabanac et al. On this hypothesis, only these animals, and not amphibians, fish, or any invertebrates, possess consciousness. Cabanac identifies a set of behavioral markers of consciousness, based on this model structural and functional theory:.

Based on supposed evidence of these phenomena in amniotes but not in non-amniotes, Cabanac argues that consciousness originated in the common ancestor of amniotes, and hence is present in all living amniotes but in no other animals. Cabanac and colleagues have documented the presence of some of these phenomena in amniotes, in contrast with their absence in at least a small number of non-amniote species, such as emotional fever Cabanac and Bernieri ; Cabanac and Cabanac ; Cabanac and Cabanac and taste aversion Paradis and Cabanac However, the assertion that these aspects of behavior and cognition do not exist outside amniota is largely based on absence of evidence and hence, inherently limited.

In particular, they do not offer direct support for their claims that non-amniotes are incapable of trading off punishments and rewards, play or detouring. Indeed, some of these claims appear to be contradicted by existing studies — for example, documentation of detouring in jumping spiders Jackson and Wilcox and work by Elwood and Appel that shows motivational trade-off behavior in hermit crabs. Cabanac's structural and functional theory of consciousness can be evaluated independently of the evidence that he marshals in support of his view of the distribution and origins of consciousness. Indeed, one might challenge his views on distribution and origins precisely by accepting his structural and functional theory, and arguing that the list of proposed indicators can actually by identified with a wider distribution i.

As we shall see, his structural and functional views of consciousness have much in common with those of other authors who argue for wider distributions of consciousness among animals. This can be appreciated by noted that a coelacanth is more closely related to a human than to a tuna, or that a tuna is more closely related to a human than it is to a shark. Basically, the folk term 'fish' refers to all vertebrates other than tetrapods, although it is somewhat ambiguous in regards to animals such as sea-horses, eels, hagfish and sting-rays.

In any case, there has a lively debate over fish consciousness, mostly focusing on the issue of whether fish can experience pain, stress and suffering see below, section 7. This is of special relevance in the context of welfare regulation in commercial aquaculture and recreational angling; accordingly, the fish consciousness literature has focused experimentally on salmonids especially salmon and trout , a group of high commercial and sport-fishing importance, but only a tiny phylogenetic corner of the animals that colloquially count as fish. Merker has proposed that consciousness originated early in vertebrate evolution, and is therefore both ancient and widespread.

On this proposal, not only mammals and birds, but amphibians and all marine vertebrates are conscious. Merker begins his argument with the phenomenological observation that the contents of conscious experience are object- and goal-oriented, but exclude the fine-grained sensory and motor details represented in peripheral and low-level neural processing. This includes:. The neuroanatomical details of Merker's argument are beyond the scope of this article to review, but his conclusion is that the systems that solve the above problems — giving rise to consciousness — arose in an early vertebrate ancestor.

Hence, consciousness is both ancient and widespread among living vertebrates. There are additional daunting challenges to addressing questions of consciousness outside the vertebrate lineage, given the radical differences between vertebrates and invertebrates with respect to anatomy and physiology. The strategy of identifying homologous and functionally analogous structures and processes, which underlies the confidence of researchers such as Cabanac , Seth et al. The vertebrate lineage represents just one of approximately 34 known phyla — ancient lineages of animals characterized by differences in fundamental anatomical organization and the developmental processes that generate it.

Each of these phyla is derived from a relatively simple state i. Hence, the invertebrates such as cephalopod mollusks e. Today, only three of the phyla vertebrates, arthropods, and mollusks include animals with complex active bodies Trestman a , characterized by:. Trestman a argues that the evolution of complex active bodies requires a capacity for integrated, embodied spatial cognition, and that this capacity evolved independently in each of the three phyla in which it is currently found vertebrates, arthropods and mollusks. If Merker is right that consciousness represents a solution to the neural-logistics problems posed by controlling a complex body in space, it may be a good bet that these three lineages are likely suspects for possessing consciousness.

This line of reasoning can be bolstered by considering the role of temporal integration of perceptual information in consciousness and in action-selection and object-oriented perception Trestman b. Perhaps each of these three lineages evolved consciousness independently during the transition from a relatively simple worm-like body morphology to having complex active bodies. One group of invertebrate animals that has received attention in the context of questions about consciousness is the coleoid cephalopods — octopuses, squids and cuttlefish.

These are large-brained, notoriously clever animals, well-known for their remarkable abilities to camouflage th emselves, and for their flexible hunting strategies. Mather argues that cephalopods exhibit many behavioral indicators of consciousness, including complex learning and spatial memory, as well as apparent play. Both Merker and Edelman et al. The other phylum that has received particular attention is the arthropods, which includes insects, crustaceans, spiders, and many other less familiar animals.

This is an ancient and tremendously diverse group of animals, so any generalizations should be made with caution. Arthropods were among the earliest animals to evolve complex active bodies — and correlatively to evolve brains capable of adaptively controlling complex adaptive bodies Trestman a , and so if the function of consciousness is to solve problems raised by the control of complex active bodies cf. Merker , it may have evolved early on in the arthropod lineage, in a common ancestor of all living arthropods.

Few studies have aimed directly at answering questions about consciousness in arthropods, but relevant empirical work includes:. Another possibility is that consciousness evolved even earlier in animal history and is even more widely distributed among animals, and hence has a function that is even more fundamental to animal life. If this is right, than consciousness may have arisen not independently in arthropods, mollusks and vertebrates, but only once in the common ancestor of these ancient groups, very early in animal evolution. With the gradual loosening of behaviorist strictures in psychology and ethology, and independent advances in neuroscience, there has been a considerable increase in the number of animal studies that have some bearing on animal consciousness.

Some of these studies focus on specific kinds of experience, such as pain, while others focus on cognitive abilities such as self-awareness that seem to be strongly correlated with human consciousness. This section contains brief reviews of some of the main areas of investigation. The aim is to provide some quick entry points into the scientific literature. Given the centrality of pain to most accounts of our ethical obligations towards animals, as well as the importance of animal models of pain in clinical medical research see Mogil for a review , it is hardly surprising that there is a substantial albeit controversial scientific literature bearing on animal pain. Reports by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in the U. Nuffield Council ; see esp. National Academy of the Sciences Institute for Animal Laboratory Research ILAR have recently covered the definition of pain and the physiological, neurological, and behavioral evidence for pain in nonhuman animals.

These reviews also distinguish pain from distress and suffering see also Bermond , and the ILAR has divided what used to be a single report on recognition and alleviation of pain and distress into two separate reports, although the scientific investigation of distress is relatively rudimentary but see Dawkins ; Farah A proper understanding of neurological studies of animal pain begins with the distinction between nociception and pain.

Nociception — the capacity to sense noxious stimuli — is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the medical leech and the marine snail Aplysia californica Walters Because nociceptors are found in a very wide range of species, and are functionally effective even in decerebrate or spinally transected animals, their presence and activity in a species provides little or no direct evidence for phenomenally conscious pain experiences. Allen argues, however, that subsequent research indicates that the direction of discovery seems uniformly towards identifying more similarities among diverse species belonging to different taxonomic classes, especially in the domains of anatomy and physiology of the nociceptive and pain systems.

It is generally accepted that the mammalian pain system has both a sensory and an affective pathway, and that these can be dissociated to some degree both pharmacologically with morphine, e. The anterior cingulate cortex ACC is a particularly important structure of the mammalian brain in this regard Price Detailed analysis of other taxonomic groups may, however, indicate important anatomical differences. Rose argues that because fish lack an ACC they may not be bothered by pain. This is in contrast to Sneddon et al. See, also, Chandroo et al. Genetic knockout animals are also providing further clues about the affective aspects of pain see Shriver for a review and application of these findings to animal welfare.

Finally, it is worth noting that a major shift in veterinary practice in regards to animal pain has occurred in the past decade. Whereas surgery on animals was once routinely practiced without analgesics or anesthetics, the vast majority of veterinary practitioners now accept the basic premise that veterinarians can be trained to recognize animal pain reliably, and that veterinary patients benefit from the same kinds of pain alleviation treatments that are delivered to humans. It has even been argued that animals possess the neurobiological mechanisms responsible for phantom limb pain and neuropathic pain pain in the presence of no obvious tissue damage or disease , and that these conditions may therefore be detectable and treatable in nonhuman animals Mathews The idea of animal emotions is, of course, prominent in Darwin's work with his book The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.

Willingness to see animals as emotional beings and humans, by contrast, as endowed with rationality that can override the emotions goes back at least to Ancient Greek philosophy. These days it is more fashionable to regard emotions as an important component of intelligence. Regardless of the merits of that view, the scientific study of animal emotions has gained its own momentum. Early in the 20th century, although they are not arguing for or about animal consciousness, physiologists recognized that significance of emotion in animal behavior.

Dror explains how the emotional state of animals was considered to be a source of noise in physiological experiments at that time, and researchers took steps to ensure that animals were calm before their experiments. According to Dror, although physiologists were forced to deal with the problem of emotional noise, attempts to treat emotion as a subject of study in its own right never crystallized to the extent of generating a journal or other institutional features Dror , Panksepp argues that these are shared by all mammals, and may be more widely shared among vertebrates.

Sufka et al. Although depending on a more anecdotal, non-experimental approach, Smuts and Bekoff each defend the attribution of conscious emotions to animals from a scientist's perspective. Bekoff has made much of play behavior as an indicator of animal emotions, an idea that is also taken up by Cabanac et al. Empathy in animals is also a topic of current investigation e. Langford et al. Byrne et al. It is worth noting that almost all of the work, both theoretical and empirical, on animal emotions has limited its scope to mammals, or at least amniotes For a notable recent exception, see Mendl et al. This work has exploited certain deep homologies of, e.

This approach is not available to animals which are very distantly related to us, i. The ancestors of vertebrates split off from the rest of the animal phyla at a time when all animals were still relatively simple, in terms of structure, tissue types, number of neurons, bodily capacities for locomotion and other forms of behavior. The elaboration of complex physiological systems occurred independently in the various phyla. Therefore the physiological systems underlying emotions in other phyla — if these exist — may be very different, and hence difficult to identify, either in terms of direct physiological observations or in terms of observations of behavioral expressions of emotion.

It is also possible that the repertoire of emotions in other phyla might be different, further problematizing the task of individuating non-vertebrate emotions. Further discussion and additional scientific references for the topic of emotions and empathy in animals can be found in the section on emotions and empathy in the entry on animal cognition. The idea that careful psychophysical work with could help us understand the nature of their subjective experiences of the world can be traced at least to Donald Griffin's experimental tests of the limits of bat echolocation.

Neural investigation adds a further layer of analysis to scientific understanding of the nature of perception. And Leopold et al. Think here of whether it is possible for the monkey to report that it is subject to Gestalt switches like those arising from ambiguous figures such as the duck-rabbit or figure-vase illusions. The non-verbal approach to assessing visual awareness has been further validated by Stoerig et al. The emphasis on visual perception in most of these examples, no doubt reflects a primatocentric bias. We human primates are highly visual creatures, and, as Nagel argued, we face considerable hurdles in imagining again, a visual metaphor the subjective experiences of creatures in modalities in which humans are weak or completely unendowed.

The examples of research also reflect an anthropocentric bias in that much of the animal experimentation is explicitly targeted at relieving human disorders. Although there is good work by neuroethologists on the psychophysics of echolocation by bats and dolphins, or on the sensory capacities of weakly electric fish, questions of subjective awareness are generally not broached in that literature.

As with the investigation of animal pain, fine-grained analysis of the neural correlates of consciousness may reveal subtle differences between different species. For instance, Rees et al. However, several neuroimaging studies in humans have presented evidence that argues for a stronger role of V1 in binocular rivalry and hence, by implication, visual awareness. A debate has unfolded in the literature over whether other animals, like humans, are capable of thinking about past and future events. Many mammals, birds and fish exhibit behavior such as food caching, nest building, tool use, or migration that seems to suggest foresight. For example, tayras — a members of the weasel family found in Central and South America — hide bunches of bananas inside of bromeliads, recovering them only when the bananas are ripe Soley et al.

However, the novelty, flexibility and ability to make situation-specific adjustments often calls such dismissals into question. For example, tayras cache several species of bananas, and accurately judge for bananas of each species when the banana is mature enough to continue ripening once picked. This includes domestic bananas, to which tayras have not been exposed over evolutionary time-scales Soley et al. A variety of careful experimental work with animals shows impressive abilities for integrated what-where-when memory — the ability to recall details of an event together with its location and time. This work was pioneered by Clayton and colleagues with scrub jays, focusing on their caching behavior — wherein the birds bury food and later recover it Clayton et al.

For example, if scrub jays are prevented from recovering their caches for long enough, they will recover only nonperishable items peanuts, in the study , ignoring their caches of otherwise preferred but perishable food mealworms, in the study Clayton et al. This debate has been somewhat complicated by the fact that proponents of the human-uniqueness of mental time travel tend to rely on descriptions of the ability that are laden with researchers' and subjects' phenomenological, introspective or intuitive descriptions of the way their own minds work e. Tulving ; Suddendorf and Corbalis , whereas animal behavior researchers must rely on strict standards of behavioral evidence to support their claims.

The question of to what extent, and in what ways, humans' awareness of time differs from that of other animals remains an open one, and an active line of research. Systematic study of self-consciousness and theory of mind in nonhuman animals has roots in an approach to the study of self-consciousness pioneered by Gallup Gallup's rationale for linking mirror-self recognition to self-awareness has already been discussed above. The idea for the experiment came from observations well-known to comparative psychologists that chimpanzees would, after a period of adjustment, use mirrors to inspect their own images.

Gallup used these observations to develop a widely-replicated protocol that appears to allow a scientific determination of whether it is merely the mirror image per se that is the object of interest to the animal inspecting it, or whether it is the image qua proxy for the animal itself that is the object of interest. Taking chimpanzees who had extensive prior familiarity with mirrors, Gallup anesthetized his subjects and marked their foreheads with a distinctive dye, or, in a control group, anesthetized them only.

Upon waking, marked animals who were allowed to see themselves in a mirror touched their own foreheads in the region of the mark significantly more frequently than controls who were either unmarked or not allowed to look into a mirror. They suggest that the lower incidence of mark touching by gorillas may be due to avoidance of socially-significant direct eye contact. For non-human primates outside the great apes, the evidence for mirror self-recognition has been sparse. Gallup himself regards it as a phenomenon restricted to the great apes only, and he was among the first to challenge Hauser's report that cotton top tamarins engaged in mirror-guided self-directed behaviors after their distinctive white tufts had been dyed neon colors, a stimulus that Hauser and coauthors argued was presumably more salient than the red dot used by Gallup Hauser et al.

Faced with Gallup's challenge, Hauser himself was unable to replicate his initial results Hauser et al. However, the idea that Gallup's protocol uses a stimulus that is not particularly salient to monkeys continues to have some currency. For example, Rajala et al. Modified versions of Gallup's experiment have also been conducted with non-primate species. Notoriously, Epstein et al. Gallup et al. Using a modified version of Gallup's procedure that involved no anesthesia, they inferred self-recognition from bodily contortions in front of the mirror self-touching being anatomically impossible for dolphins.

This evidence has been disputed e. Wynne The mirror-mark test continues to be an area of active investigation in various species including elephants Plotnik et al. Various commentators have pointed out that the mirror test may not be entirely fair for species which depend more heavily on senses other than vision Mitchell ; Bekoff and Burghardt An intriguing line of research into animals' knowledge of their own mental states considers the performance of animals in situations of cognitive uncertainty. The fact that animals who have no bailout option and are thus forced to respond to the difficult comparisons do worse than those who have the bailout option but choose to respond to the test has been used to argue for some kind of higher-order self understanding.

The original experiments have attracted both philosophical criticism of the second-order interpretation e. They also raise the question of what this might tell us about the phenomenal features of that cognition. Browne argues that the dolphin research cannot support the connection to theory of mind, but that it nevertheless is relevant to consciousness in dolphins, particularly within the theoretical framework provided by Lycan, described above. The notion of metacognition also seems relevant to questions about access consciousness.

For additional discussion of self awareness and metacognition, readers are referred to the section on theory of mind and metacognition in the entry on animal cognition. An article such as this perhaps raises more questions than it answers, but the topic would be of little philosophical interest if it were otherwise. It is clear that for many philosophers, the topic of animal consciousness is no longer only of peripheral interest. There is increasing interest in animal cognition from a range of philosophical perspectives, including ethics, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science.

Philosophers working in all of these areas are increasingly attentive to the particular details of scientific theory, methods, and results. Many scientists and philosophers believe that the groundwork has been laid for addressing at least some of the questions about animal consciousness in a philosophically sophisticated yet empirically tractable way. Yet there remain critics from both sides: on the one hand are those who still think that subjective phenomena are beyond the pale of scientific research, and on the other are those who think that science and philosophy have not moved far enough or fast enough to recognize animal consciousness.

The arguments on both sides are by no means exhausted. Colin Allen would like to acknowledge the assistance of Ronak Shah in preparing the revision of this entry. Motivations: Framing human-animal analogies 2. Concepts of Consciousness 3. Historical Background 4. Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues 4. The Structure and Function of Consciousness 6. Evolution and Distribution of Consciousness 6. Special Topics in the Study of Animal Consciousness 7. Lloyd Morgan's Double Induction Method from his textbook Even though the double inductive method is now mainly of historical interest, Morgan's canon lives on. Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues The topic of consciousness in nonhuman animals has been primarily of epistemological interest to philosophers of mind.

Two central questions are: Can we know which animals beside humans are conscious? The Distribution Question [ 5 ] Can we know what, if anything, the experiences of animals are like? As Searle puts it, I do not infer that my dog is conscious, any more than, when I came into this room, I inferred that the people present are conscious. I simply respond to them as is appropriate to conscious beings. I just treat them as conscious beings and that is that. However, he argues that these attitudes are incorrect, and we have a moral imperative to purge or at least override them: In the case of brutes: since their experiences, including their pains, are nonconscious ones, their pains are of no immediate moral concern Neither the pain of the broken leg, itself, nor its further effects upon the life of the dog, have any rational claim upon our sympathy Are we really capable of suppressing our sympathy when we see an animal especially a cuddly one in severe pain?

The Vita Merlini Research Paper Anne, the Princess Royalthe animal liberation front attacks of the British Animals in War Memorial animal liberation front attacks, stated that animals adapt animal liberation front attacks what Hazing And Harassment want them to do, but that they animal liberation front attacks not do things that they animal liberation front attacks not want to, even with training. California Assembly Animal liberation front attacks on Agriculture. About animal liberation front attacks. Dol, et al. Gender In Children Literature Behavior animal liberation front attacks, 46, — The use of wild-caught primates was banned, except where "exceptional and specific Personal Narrative: Managing Money While Playing Sports can be established"; specific justification must be made for the use of Old World primates but not for the use of New World primates animal liberation front attacks approval for the acquisition animal liberation front attacks primates from animal liberation front attacks is conditional animal liberation front attacks their breeding or animal liberation front attacks center being acceptable to the Home Animal liberation front attacks and each batch Definition Essay: The Two Most Common Use Of Stress primates acquired animal liberation front attacks overseas must be separately authorized. Retrieved 11 May

Current Viewers: